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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On or about August 10, 2005, Plaintiff!Appellant John Block (hereinafter referred to as

"Block") purchased land from Jack Streibick (hereinafter referred to as "Streibick") and the
estate of Streibick's deceased wife. R. Vol. 1, p. 13. This property was within the City of
Lewiston, Idaho. Id. After Block purchased the property, it was subdivided several times, and
houses were built on the property, R. Vol. I, pp. 13 - 15. After the houses were constructed,
defects were discovered in or around three of the properties, which, despite numerous repairs to
the properties at issue, ultimately resulted in two of the three houses having to be removed from
the properties and the third house having significant structural repair. R. Vol. I, pp. 57 - 58.
Block alleges that the problems with these three houses resulted from a number of issues
(including having built on property with improperly placed fill, having built on a landslide fault,
etc.), but which he generally referred to as the property having a "defective condition". R. Vol. I,
pp. 17 - 18, 20. Block also built a number of other houses on the properties that he purchased
from Streibick, none of which suffered any physical damage, but for which Block is claiming
lost value. R. Vol. II, pp. 348, 353 - 55.
Block brought claims against Streibick (and Streibick's deceased wife's estate) for
misrepresentation, breach of the affirmative duty to disclose, breach of implied warranty, breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. R. Vol. I, pp. 20 - 23. Block also
brought claims against the City of Lewiston (hereinafter referred to as the "City") and former
City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw ("Cutshaw") for negligence and gross negligence. R. Vol. 1, pp.
23 - 25.
This appeal only has to do with Block's negligence claims against the City and Cutshaw.
The claims against Streibick were settled and Block agreed to dismiss those claims. R. Vol. 1, p.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1

7; Vol. IV, pp. 727, 730. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the City and Cutshaw on all
of Block's claims, on the grounds that the City and Cutshaw were immune under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act, and that no duty was owed to Block. R. Vol. IV, p. 837.

B.

Statement of the Facts
Block has presented a fairly exhaustive Statement of the Case in his opening brief.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 7 - 17. Further, relevant facts were presented in the briefing on the various
summary judgments. R. Vol. I, pp. 55 - 59; R. Vol. II, pp. 356 - 64. The City and Cutshaw
present just those additional necessary facts, along with pointing out errors in Block's facts:
With regard to Kenneth Morrison filling the canyon at issue (Appellant's Brief, p. 8), he
testified that the fill was compacted and tested at the time it was done. R. Vol. II, p. 267
(Morrison Dep., pp. 25 - 26).
Block contends that a landslide happened in Sunset Palisades No.4 ("SP 4"), block 3, in
1999. Appel/ant's Brief, p. 9. However, there is no evidence which supports that
contention. The facts show that in 1999, Terry Howard (an independent engineer), while
doing work on another project for Nez Perce County, saw cracks in the earth in SP 4,
took photographs, and provided the photographs to the City. R. Vol. II, p. 248. There was
no studv
. done bv. Howard or Streibick as to how old the crack was, when it occurred,
what caused it, or whether it was the result of earth movement or some other cause. There
is no doubt that the City put the photograph in the SP 4 subdivision file, as that is where
Block found it when he searched the file in 2009. R. Vol. II, p. 278.
With regard to the detention pond at issue, it was originally constructed as part of SP 4,
not Sunset Palisades 8 ("SP 8"). Appellant's Brief, p. 8. However, it did not work well,
and filled in. Streibick later had to repair it when he subdivided SP 4, block 3, into SP 8
in 2005. When Block later subdivided SP 8 into Canyon Greens ("CG"), at the suggestion
of his engineer, he moved it to the bottom of the hill, where it currently sits.
Block contends he purchased SP 8 from Streibick in December, 2005. Appel/ant's Brief,
p. 10. This is incorrect. The purchase documents were signed August 10, 2005. See R.
Vol. I, p. 13 (Verified Complaint, ~ 11). SP 8 was not approved until later in August,
2005. R. Vol. II, pp. 257 - 58 (Administrative Plat for SP 8), 259 - 60 (Amended
Administrative Plat for SP 8).
Block contends that "could not have discovered evidence of the 1999 landslide by simply
reviewing the City's files on the lots he purchased." Appel/ant's Brief, p. 15. However, as
pointed out above, this is incorrect. Though Block may have intended to purchase lots 1 4 of SP 8, when he signed the purchase agreement on August 10, 2005, the plat for SP 8
had not been recorded or approved yet. R. Vol. II, pp. 368 - 69 (City Council meeting at
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which approval took place did not occur until August 15, 2005). Therefore, the only
subdivision file at which Block could have looked (if he had chosen to look at a City file,
which he did not do), was SP 4, which, as Block later pointed out, had the Tim Richard
memo in it. R. Vol. I, p. 17 (Complaint, ~ 23).
Prior to contracting for the installation of the helical piers to resolve the 2007 slope
movement, Block was specifically told that without doing a slope stability analysis, it
would be impossible to know whether installation of the helical piers would resolve the
issues with his house. R. Vol. I, p. 82.
The company Block hired to give him advice on his property in 2007 (Strata, Inc.),
Appellant's Brief, p. 12, was the same company that Terry Howard worked for when he
took the picture of the alleged slope movement in 1999. R. Vol. II, p. 296.
Block states that the City did not inform him that fill had been placed on the property.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 14 - 15. However, Block has admitted that he knew he was
building on fill. R. Vol. II, p. 282 (Block Dep., pp. 195 - 96).
Block contends he "did conduct reasonable due diligence" prior to purchasing the
property. Appellant's Brief, p. 16. This contradicts his prior statements. Block has
admitted that he purchased the lots without walking the properties and without doing any
due diligence. R. Vol. II, pp. 279 - 80 (Block Dep., pp. 184 - 85).
Block contends that he may have forgone purchase of the property had the City disclosed
the defects in the property. Appellant's Brief, p. 16. However, Block provides no
evidence that he ever communicated with the City about the property prior to signing the
purchase documents in August, 2005.
Block's expert testified that all of Block's losses were economic. R. Vol. II, pp. 344, 346
(Rudd Dep., pp. 41,50 - 51). There was no allegation of physical damage to the houses
which were built on Canyon Greens 2 ("CG 2"). R. Vol. II, p. 348 (Rudd Dep., pp. 11213).
Prior to 1997, the Lewiston City Subdivision Code had requirements for mandatory slope
stability and/or geotechnical analysis. See R. Vol. II, pp. 387 - 440. In 1997, the City of
Lewiston substantially revised the Subdivision Code pursuant to Lewiston City
Ordinance 4177. Id. After Ordinance 4177, requirements for slope stability and/or
geotechnical analysis of property was discretionary. Id. (specifically §§ 32-9(b)(2)(f), 3220(c)(2) and 32-31(e)).
All subdivision plats at issue were approved by the Lewiston City Council, and other
entities with authority to approve such plans/designs. R. Vol. II, pp. 257 - 62 (plats of SP
8 and CG, and amended plat for SP 8).

c.

Procedural History
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Block filed a Notice of Tort Claim against the City and Cutshaw on or around August 26,
2009. R. Vol. I, p. 58. On or around October 22,2009, he filed a Complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 11. This

Complaint contained multiple breach of contract causes of action against Streibick. Against the
City and Cutshaw, it only contained one negligence cause of action, R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 25, though
such negligence cause of action had numerous subparts, as follows:
55.
The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others had a duty to act with
reasonable care under the circumstances and without negligence. The City of
Lewiston, Cutshaw, the City Engineer(s) and Others, acting within the course of
their employment or duties, breached that duty of care by
(i)

failing to notify and/or warn Block at the time he sought building permits
for 153,155 and 159 and Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7 of canyon Greens No.
2 of earth movement that the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and Others knew
had occurred in 1999 within the area of 153, 155 and 159 and that such
earth movement had neither been eliminated nor properly abated in any
manner,

(ii)

failing to take any action to prevent, restrict or regulate development
within the area of 153, 155 and 159 until such earth movement had been
eliminated or properly abated,

(iii)

failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155, and
159 be eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to
Block's purchase of the Property,

(iv)

failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155, and 159
to Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such earth movement
had occurred in 1999 or without having eliminated or properly abated such
earth movement

(v)

failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water
improvements in 1994 for Palisades No.4 subdivision and approving and
allowing Streibick's construction of a storm water detention pond within
the area of 153 where the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew
earth movement had occurred in 1999, thereby contributing to the
instability of soil in that area,

(vi)

approving the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without
notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement had occurred on 153,
155 and 159 in 1999 and had not been eliminated or properly abated;

(vii)

failing to require an approved design or plan incorporating engineering
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standards applicable to the grading, filling, compacting of soil, detaining
of storm water and constructing of residences on the Property and failing
to approve such a design or plan and/or to require compliance with such
design or plan prior to any such improvements being allowed by the City
of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others and/or undertaken to eliminate or
properly abate such earth movement within the area of 153, 155 and 159;
(viii)

failing to act with ordinary care to protect against the likely risks, danger
and adverse consequences from such earth movement the City of
Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew had occurred in the area of 153,
155 and 159in 1999;

(ix)

failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate
the dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result of such earth
movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159;

(x)

failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of
153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment
of such earth movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk
of harm; and

(xi)

failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of Streibick's
development activities within the area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999
and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the
creation of a dangerous condition and risk of harm.

R. Vol. I, pp. 23 - 25 (Complaint, ,-r 55).
The City and Cutshaw initially filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied.
R. Vol. I, p. 179. After significant discovery, the City and Cutshaw filed a second Motion for

Summary Judgment on June 28, 2011. R Vol. I, p. 213. The City and Cutshaw argued several
reasons why summary judgment should be granted. A hearing on the second Motion for
Summary Judgment was held on August 9, 2011. Tr. Vol. I, p. 4. On Oct. 14, 2011, Judge
Kerrick issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting the City's and Cutshaw's second
Motion for Summary Judgment on several grounds. R. Vol. IV, p. 816.
On October 28, 2011 Block filed a Motion for Reconsideration. R. Vol. IV, p. 839. A
hearing was held on Block's Motion for Reconsideration on November 29,2011. R. Vol. I, p. 10.
On January 4, 2012, Judge Kerrick issued a Memorandum Opinion on Block's Motion for
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Reconsideration, affirming the prior Memorandum Decision. R. Vol. V, p. 1020. Judgment was
entered on behalf of the City and Lowell Cutshaw on February 1,2012. R. Vol. V, pp. 1033 - 34.
Block filed a Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2012. R. Vol. V, p. 1023.

II.

RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

It is the understanding of the City and Cutshaw that Block is appealing each of the bases

on which summary judgment was granted below (i.e. whether there was a duty owed to Block,
whether the economic loss rule applied, and whether the immunities under I C §§ 6-904(1) and
(7) and 6-904B(3) and (4) apply). The City and Cutshaw also state the following issues on
appeal:
1. Can the Judgment in favor of the City and Cutshaw be affirmed on any grounds other
than what was decided by Judge Kerrick?
2. Are the City and Cutshaw entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to IC §§ 12117, 6-918A, or any other applicable statute or rule?
3. Are the City and Cutshaw entitled to costs on appeal pursuant to IA.R. 40,IR.CP.
54, or any other applicable statute or rule?

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

BECAUSE THE CITY AND CUTSHAW HAVE NO DUTY TO ALL FUTURE
OWNERS OF A PROPERTY, BLOCK CANNOT PREVAIL ON ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR TO PURCHASE OF THE
PROPERTY.
The City and Cutshaw made two general duty arguments: there was no duty to Block

before he owned the property, and there was no duty to protect against economic loss (discussed
in more detail in § B below). With regard to the former, such arguments only applied to a portion
of Block's claims, specifically Complaint

~~

55 (iii - v, ix - xi). On this issue, Judge Kerrick

concluded that "The City does not owe a duty to any person who may purchase land in Lewiston,
from any current landowner, at a future date." R. Vol. IV, p. 827. Block now makes several
arguments as to why a duty was owed to Block (though it is not clear that Block is limiting the
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6

discussion of duty to the time prior to when he purchased the property). Appel/ant's Brief, pp. 18
- 25. The City will address each of Block's arguments in turn.
1.

Block's Negligence Per Se Argument Should be Reiected Because it was
Presented for the First Time on Appeal, and Because Block Cannot Establish
Negligence Per Se.

First, Block makes a negligence per se argument, contending that the City Subdivision
Ordinance should replace the standard duty of care. Appel/ant's Brief, pp. 19 - 21. This is the
first time that negligence per se has been addressed in this case, as it was never plead in the
Complaint. l Judge Kerrick's Memorandum Opinions (both on the original motion for summary
judgment and the motion for reconsideration) never once mention negligence per se. See R. Vol.
IV, pp. 820 - 27 (discussing negligence arguments) and Vol. V, pp. 1010 - 16 (discussing
negligence arguments). Perhaps this was because Block never addressed it, in either his briefing
on the motion for summary judgment or motion for reconsideration. R. Vol. III, pp. 459 - 75
(Opposition to Summary Judgment, discussion of duties), and Vol. V, pp. 965 - 68 (Amended
Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, discussing the City's duty). Block cannot now
raise this issue for the first time on appeal. "The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will
not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho
340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008) (quoting Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181
P.3d 435, 438 (2007)). See also Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 101, 106 P.3d 425, 427
(2005) (same holding); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001) (holding the
same). Block should not now be allowed to argue a new substantive issue on appeal which was
never addressed to the Court below.
Even if the Court were to consider Block's negligence per se argument, Block cannot
See R. Vo!. I, pp. 23 - 25 (allegations against the City and Cutshaw). Failure to plead negligence per se is
not always dispositive. See Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co .. Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 898-99, 188 P.3d 834, 840-41
(2008) (a party need not specifically plead negligence per se in order to receive a jury instruction on such issue).
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show the four elements necessary to establish negligence per se. See O'Guin v. Bingham County,
142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005) (discussing elements of negligence per se);
Obendorf, at 899, 841 (same). First, Block points to language in Lewiston City Code §§ 32-2,
32-8, 32-9, and 32-31. Appellant's Brief, pp. 19 - 20. These sections either contain discretionary
language or give general guidelines and do not "clearly define the required standard of conduct."
Obendorfat 899, 841. For example, § 32-2 is titled "Purpose and Intent", and does not give any
specific mandates. R. Vol. II, p. 387. Similarly, § 32-31 deals with "opinion[s] of the subdivision
committee", Appellant's Brief, p. 20, which does not clearly define standards of conduct. As to §
32-9, the only action required is that the City "inspect the site", and then if the city engineer so
requires, have certain additional studies done. Appellant's Brief, p. 20. Again, this discretion
does not set forth clearly defined standards of conduct.
Block also cannot show that the Lewiston City Codes were designed to protect him.
Obendorfat 899, 841. As one court has stated, "It is apparent from the language of the [building
code], and from commentators that "[t]he primary purpose of such codes and ordinances is ... to
protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect the personal
or property interests of individuals." Island Shores Estates Condo. Ass'n v. City of Concord, 136
N.H. 300, 307, 615 A.2d 629, 633 (1992). The Lewiston Subdivision Code was not intended to
protect the developer, but the City and its residents. See Lewiston City Code § 32-2(a) (R. Vo!. II,
p.387).
Block also can't establish the fourth element of negligence per se, in that he cannot show
that the City's and/or Cutshaw's negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. Obendorf at
899,841. Though not ruled on by Judge Kerrick2, the City and Cutshaw contended that there was

2

The City and Cutshaw still seek to have judgment affirmed on these grounds. "The respondent can seek to
sustain a judgment for reasons that were presented to the trial court even though they were not addressed or relied
upon by the trial court in its decision." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 39198-2011,2012
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no evidence before the District Court (nor is there in the record before this court) of what caused
the slope movement which resulted in injury to Block's properties. R. Vol. 1, pp. 201 - 02.
Block's experts have admitted that without doing a geotechnical evaluation of the property
(which they have not done), they cannot know what caused the slope movement. R. Vol. IV, pp.
713 - 14. There must be some evidence of causation, or else an essential element of a negligence
claim is not met. See Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997); Nation v. State,
144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007) (essential element of negligence claim is causation); Esterbrook v.

State, 124 Idaho 680, 683 (1993) (burden of proof for negligence is on Plaintiff). Because
Block's own experts don't know what caused the slope movement, see R. Vol. IV, pp. 713 - 14,
Block cannot establish that the City or Cutshaw proximately caused his injuries. Therefore, the
City and Cutshaw request that this Court determine that negligence per se does not apply.
2.

Block Incorrectly Argues that the Public Duty Rule Establishes a Duty to Him.

Next, Block addresses the public duty rule. Judge Kerrick found the "public duty rule" to
be instructive, and determined that no liability could attach to the City and Cutshaw because no
duty existed. Block attempts to argue that the City had a public duty to provide information and
handle applications in a particular manner. Appellant's Brief, pp. 21 - 22. However, the public
duty rule does not apply in the manner which Block states, nor does it create any duty to Block
(or any potential future land owner) before the property is purchased. The existence of a duty is a
question oflaw. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247 (1999). "No liability arises from the law
of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386,
389 (2001). Numerous Idaho cases have made it clear that a party cannot recover from a
governmental entity for failure to perform a duty owed to the public at large. "[I]f the duty which

WL 6620615 at *6 (Idaho Dec. 20, 2012) (citing Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290,
292 (1987».
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the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an
inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual, injury, and must be
redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution." Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351,
359 (1943). See also Worden v. Witt, 4 Idaho 404, 406 - 07 (1895).
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from
injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Applying this
principle to governmental torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires
that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the
general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable.
Radke v. County o{Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005) (cited in Rees v. State, 143
Idaho 10, 16 (2006)). Two cases illustrate this concept. In Udy v. Custer County, the plaintiff
argued that a sheriff who saw rocks lying on a road (which later caused a motor vehicle accident)
had a duty to clear the rocks or give notice to someone to move them. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389.
This Court stated
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which there
can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. Here, the record
does not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special
relationship with Sheriff Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have
been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to
establish a duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for Sheriff
Roskelley's liability in tort.
Udy, 136 Idaho at 391. In other words, absent a special relationship, there was no duty owed to
the plaintiff just because there may have been a duty to the public at large.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has dealt with a similar issue. In Island Shores
Estates Condo. Ass'n v. City o{Concord, 136 N.H. 300, 615 A.2d 629 (1992), the plaintiff was a
condominium association who sued the city for issuing occupancy permits after (allegedly)
improperly inspecting the condominiums. Id. at 302, 630. The plaintiff contended that the city's
failure to discover "a litany of flaws . . . constitutes gross negligence and the construction
approved by defendant threatens the structural integrity of the units and the health and safety of
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 10

its occupants; that resultant harm to the owners of the units has occurred." Id. In dismissing the
claims against the city, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated the following:
As developed, the public duty rule represents a limitation on liability for
municipal acts that are carried out for the general welfare. In cases where by
statute or ordinance a public official has a general duty to perform a function for
the public's benefit, it has been held that liability will not be imposed for the
negligent performance of this duty, unless the plaintiff can establish an individual
duty owed him.
Id. at 303,631. Ultimately, the New Hampshire Supreme Court did not even discuss whether the

duty was public or not, because "a duty must exist before we reach the question of whether it is a
public duty or a private duty. We do not reach any issues involving the public duty rule because
we find the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff." Id. at 304, 631. The court went on to
state that
We note the countervailing interests in limiting the duty of the city. The
defendant asserts the danger of making the city the insurer of every building
project if the issuance of a certificate of occupancy is deemed a representation
upon which the world can rely. The recognition of the dangers of such unlimited
liability is not a vestige of municipal immunity, but is a consideration that must
be a factor in every negligence analysis.
The city is not engaged in the trade of inspecting buildings to help buyers
determine the commercial feasibility of building ownership. Had the plaintiff
wished to assure itself of the commercial feasibility of the construction, the duty
was the plaintiffs, and could have been met by utilizing its own resources or by
hiring private contractors. By using different standards and focusing on different
aspects, the private contractor may well have presented information that caused
the plaintiffs members to corne to different conclusions as to the financial
wisdom of purchasing their units. Such private business considerations are
unrelated to the purpose of the municipality's inspection, which must remain
focused on setting and enforcing sufficient standards to ensure the safety of
structures.
Id. at 306-07,633. With regard to the second allegation in Island Shores (that a duty arose under

the city building codes), the court held that such codes no duty existed because the codes are to
"protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect the
personal or property interests of individuals." Id. at 307,633.
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The same analysis should apply in this case. Despite Block's contentions that the City
and/or Cutshaw owed him a duty to provide accurate information3, there is no reason to make the
City liable for acts done prior to Block's purchase of the property. Such a duty would create
crushing burden on municipalities, and potentially subject them to enduring liability. See Rife v.
Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143, 148-49 (1995) (imposing a duty on a school district

to protect students after school hours would be debilitating). If, as in Rife and Summers v.
Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004), a school

district has no duty to its students when they leave its custody, a city certainly should not have a
duty to someone before they purchase property. In any case, Block's claims don't make logical
sense. For example, Block contends that the City was negligent in failing to prevent Streibick
from selling the property to Block. R. Vol. I, p. 24 (Complaint,

~

55(iv)). How the City could

have prevented such a sale (absent exercising eminent domain) is impossible to guess, as cities
are not generally notified before property is sold. Block certainly never provided the City with a
chance to give him information about the property before he purchased it4 , because he never
asked the City any questions about the property before signing the sales contract. R. Vol. II, p.
279. Therefore, the City and Cutshaw ask that this Court conclude that Judge Kerrick properly
ruled no duty was owed to Block before he purchased the property.s
3.

Block Cannot Show a Duty Arose Due to a Special Relationship Between Block
and the City.

Block's third allegation is that there was a special relationship between the City/Cutshaw

See Appellant's Brief, p. 22 (citing Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 596 P.2d 1096 (Wash. App. Div. 3, 1979».
4
This case is distinguished from Rogers based on the fact that the plaintiff in Rogers actually went and asked
the city for information about the property before it was purchased. Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 23 Wash. App. 554,
555,596 P.2d 1096 (1979). Block never made such a request for information from the City or Cutshaw until 2009,
four years after he purchased the property. R. Vol. II, p. 279.

To the extent that Block contends the City owed him a duty after he purchased the property, see Appellant's
Brief, pp. 21 - 22, no duty exists to protect from economic loss. See§ B, below.
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and Block. Appellant's Brief, pp. 22 - 24. Block argues that this special relationship arose under
the public duty rule, citing the four-part test utilized in Rees v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare,
143 Idaho 10, 16, 137 P.3d 397, 403 (2006). However, that test applied to whether an affirmative
duty arose to protect a child suspected of suffering from child abuse. Id. at 15, 402. Even if the
test did apply, Block's contention that "there exists genuine issues of material fact" regarding the
elements of the test (see Appellant's Brief, p. 24) would not bar summary judgment, as the
existence of a duty is a question of law, not of fact. Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 675,
273 P.3d 1266, 1268 (2012). In any case, Block couldn't meet the elements of the Rees test.
Block contends that the City had knowledge of a dangerous condition, i.e. the 1999 landslide.
Appellant's Brief, p. 24. While Block can show that the City was notified of alleged earth
movement in or around 1999, he cannot show that it actually was earth movement, when the
earth movement occurred, whether anyone knew if it would occur again, what caused it, or if the
movement had stabilized. Thus, he has nothing more than speculation that the condition, as it
appeared in 1999, was dangerous. Second, Block cannot show that he relied on anything prior to
purchasing the property, because he admits he never asked the City anything. Third, Block also
cannot show that any ordinance was intended for his protection, as opposed to general protection
of the pUblic. 6 Thus, there was no special relationship with Block prior to his purchase of the
property.
4.

The City Could Not Assume a Duty to Block Six Years Before he Purchased the
Property.

Finally, Block contends that the City assumed a duty to him by putting a memo with
pictures of the 1999 earth movement in the SP 4 file. Appellant's Brief, p. 25. In essence, he

6

Again, building codes "protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect
the personal or property interests of individuals." Island Shores Estates Condo. Ass'n, 136 N.H. at 307, 615 A.2d at
633.
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argues the City assumed a duty to him in 1999, six years before he purchased the property. This
makes little sense. Legally, a party cannot assume a general duty. See Martin v. Twin Falls Sch.
Dist. No. 411, 138 Idaho 146, 150, 59 P.3d 317, 321 (2002) ("When a party assumes a duty by
voluntarily performing an act that the party had no duty to perform, the duty that arises is limited
to the duty actually assumed."); Udy, 136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069 (by voluntarily removing
rocks and other debris from the highway on other prior occasions, the county sheriff did not
assume the duty of doing so on the night in question); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,903 P.2d
73 (1995) (by helping some troubled students in the past, teacher did not assume the duty of
helping a particular student who later committed suicide). In other words, the City could not
have assumed a duty to every potential future owner (including Block) of the property just by
putting a picture in a subdivision file in 1999. No favorable reading of the facts leads to the
conclusion that the City and Cutshaw assumed a duty to Block.
In sum, Block has misconstrued the argument made by the City and Cutshaw with regard
to duty. The only argument made is that the City and Cutshaw owed no duty to Block before he
purchased the property at issue. Most of Block's arguments apply to after he purchased the
property. Therefore, the City and Cutshaw request that this Court conclude that Judge Kerrick
properly dismissed those of Block's claims which allege negligence prior to his purchase of the
property.
B.

THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO THIS CASE BECAUSE ALL OF
BLOCK'S LOSSES WERE LOST PROFITS AND OTHER PURELY ECONOMIC
LOSSES, AND NO EXCEPTION APPLIES.
In addition to the duty arguments discussed above, the City and Cutshaw contend that no

duty was owed to Block because, under the economic loss rule, "Unless an exception applies, the
economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence action because
there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling &
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Pump Co. Inc., 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 at *7 (Idaho Dec. 20,2012) (quoting Blahd v.
Richard B. Smith. Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 PJd 996, 1000 (2005)). Stated another way,
"this Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all
negligence actions." Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195,
1200 (1995). As all of Block's claims against the City and Cutshaw are negligence based, Block
may not recover if he only suffered economic loss.
The City and Cutshaw contend that all of Block's loss constituted economic loss. Further,
the City and Cutshaw contend that there is no exception to the economic loss rule. These issues
will be discussed below.
1. The Economic Loss Rule Should Apply because the only Damage was to Property
which was the Subject Matter of the Transaction between Block and Streibick.
Block contends that his losses are not economic because he suffered property damage,
thus preventing the application of the economic loss rule. Appellant's Brief, p. 44. However, the
facts, the law, and Block's own admissions result in the conclusion that all of Block's losses fall
under the definition of economic loss. Block is trying to recover his contractual expectation
damages against the City and Cutshaw under a negligence claim. This should not be allowed.
The history of the economic loss rule shows that the economic loss rule was created to
prevent parties from seeking contract damages under tort claims.
The purpose of the economic loss rule is to define the line between recovery in
tort and recovery in contract, and it reflects an attempt to maintain the separation
or distinction between contract law and tort law. The rule prevents the law of
contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other.
63B Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 1797. As another source states,
The economic-loss doctrine forbids a party from suing or recovering in tort for
economic or pecuniary losses that arise only from breach of contract or are
associated with the contract relationship . . . . The doctrine provides that a
contracting party who suffers purely economic losses, which is the loss of the
benefit of one's bargain, must seek his or her remedy in contract and not in tort as
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such claims are instead governed by contract law.
74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 24. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "The economic loss rule is a
judicially created doctrine that marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, which
protects expectancy interests created through agreement between the parties, and tort law, which
protects individuals and their property from physical ham1 by imposing a duty of reasonable
care." Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing.
LC, 221 P.3d 234, 242 (UT 2009). See also Town orAlma v. Azco Const., Inc., 10 PJd 1256,
1259 (Colo. 2000) ("Broadly speaking, the economic loss rule is intended to maintain the
boundary between contract law and tort law."); Dewayne Rogers Logging. Inc. v. Propac Indus.!
Ltd., 299 S.W.3d 374,382-83 (Tex. App. 2009) ("When the only loss or damage is to the subject
matter of the contract, the plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the contract."). The Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized that breach of contract and negligence claims "are two distinct theories of
recovery." Aardema v. US. Dairy Svs., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 790, 215 P.3d 505,510 (2009). The
Supreme Court of Colorado has summadzed the rationale of the economic loss rule:
Although originally born from products liability law, the application of the
economic loss rule is broader, because it serves to maintain a distinction between
contract and tort law. The essential difference between a tort obligation and a
contract obligation is the source of the duties of the parties.
Tort obligations generally arise from duties imposed by law. Tort law is designed
to protect all citizens from the risk of physical harm to their persons or to their
property. These duties are imposed by law without regard to any agreement or
contract.
In contrast, contract obligations arise from promises made between parties.
Contract law is intended to enforce the expectancy interests created by the pm1ies'
promises so that they can allocate risks and costs during their bargaining.
Limiting tort liability when a contract exists between parties is appropriate
because a product's potential nonperformance can be adequately addressed by
rational economic actors bargaining at arms length to shape the terms of the
contract. For example, a buyer may demand additional warranties on a product
while agreeing to pay a higher price, or the same buyer may choose to assume a
higher level of risk that a product will not perform properly by accepting a more
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limited warranty in exchange for a lower product price. Limiting the availability
of t011 remedies in these situations holds parties to the terms of their bargain. In
this way, the law serves to encourage parties to confidently allocate risks and
costs during their bargaining without fear that unanticipated liability may arise in
the future, effectively negating the parties' efforts to build these cost
considerations into the contract. The economic loss rule thus serves to ensure
predictability in commercial transactions.
Determining when a contract action will lie and when a tort action will lie
requires maintaining this distinction in the sources of the respective obligations.
The phrase "economic loss rule" necessarily implies that the focus of the inquiry
under its analysis is on the type of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.
However, the relationship between the type of damages suffered and the
availability of a t011 action is inexact at best. Examining the type of damages
suffered may assist in determining the source of the duty underlying the action
(e.g., most actions for lost profits are based on breaches of contractual duties
while most actions involving physical injuries to persons are based on common
law duties of care).
Town orAima, 10 P.3d at 1262-63. Thus, the essence of the economic loss rule is to prevent a
party from attempting to recover contract based damages in tort.
Though the economic loss rule arose out of product liability law, the Idaho Supreme
COUli has recognized that it may apply outside of that realm. See Brian & Christie. Inc. v.
Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 26, 244 P .3d 166, 170 (2010) ("The economic loss rule
applies to negligence cases in general; its application is not restricted to products liability
cases."). FUliher, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the economic loss rule's applicability
where there is not even a contract between the plaintiff and defendant. See Duffin v. Idaho Crop
Imp. Ass'n, ] 26 Idaho 1002, 1005-06, 895 P.2d 1195, 1198-99 (1995) (no allegation of contract
with the defendant Idaho Department of Agriculture, to whom the economic loss rule later
applied). 7 Thus, the economic loss rule may apply in this case where there is no allegation of a
contract between Block and the City/Cutshaw. The question is then whether Block's losses
7

Block makes a great deal out of the fact that there is no contract between the City/Cutshaw and Block.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 39 - 41. However, there is no case which states that the economic loss rule only applies when
the defendant is a party to a contract. As DufJin points out above, the opposite is true. The economic loss rule may
apply to parties, including governmental entities, even though they never had a contract with the plaintiff.
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constitute economic loss.
The Supreme Court has stated that "Economic loss includes costs of repair and
replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial
loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman

Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351 (1975). This definition has been followed by a
majority of cases addressing economic 10ss. 8 This definition makes sense considering the history
of the economic loss rule, as contractual damages typically include replacement or repair of the
subject of the contract and lost profits or loss of use. See, e.g., Cuddy Mountain Concrete Inc. v.

Citadel Canst., Inc., 121 Idaho 220, 225,824 P.2d 151, 156 (Ct. App. 1992) (lost profits allowed
in contract actions);

Ie § 28-2-714 (damages in contract actions). The Salmon River definition

supposes that in order for there to be economic loss there be defective property which is the
subject of the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec. ,

Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010). In other words, this definition can apply to cases
"involving the purchase of defective personal property and real property." Id. at 170.

The

Supreme Court has excluded from the definition of economic loss "damage to property other
than that which is the subject of the transaction." Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho
785, 791,215 P.3d 505, 511 (2009) (quoting Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196,983 P.2d 848,
850 (1999)).9 As the Supreme Court has recently stated, "Damages from harm to person or
property are not purely economic losses. [E]conomic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic
to an injury to person or property." Stapleton, 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 at *7 (internal
See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho lO02, 1007 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113
Idaho 37, 41 (1987); Blahdv. Richard B. Smith. Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300 (2005); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,
196 (1999); Aardema v. Us. Dairy Svs., 147 Idaho 785, 790 (2009). Cf Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec.,
Inc., 244 P.3d 166,170 (Idaho 20lO) (holding that the definition provided of economic loss in the Salmon Rivers
case does not apply to claims for economic loss related to services, as opposed to defective property).
9

Also, a different standard applies when the contract involves services, as opposed to purchase of property.
See Brian & Christie, Inc.. , 150 Idaho at 27,244 P.3d at 171; Oppenheimer Indus .. Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc.,
112 Idaho 423, 426, 732 P.2d 661, 664 (1986).
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citations and quotation marks omitted). The City and Cutshaw contend (and Judge Kerrick
found 10) that there was no damage to separate property which would prevent the application of
the economic loss rule.
Block argues that because he only purchased bare property with an unknown defect in it,
only damage to that bare property (as a result of the defect) would result in economic loss to
Block. Appellant's Brief, p. 39. Block further contends that the improvements he made to the
property suffered damage (cracks in house walls, warped floors, broken windows and gas lines,
etc.), and because these improvements were not on the property when he purchased it, he has
suffered damage to property which was not the subject of the transaction. Appellants' Brief, p.
44. Based on this, Block contends he is entitled to recover all of his damages (i.e. damages to
both the improvements and to the property itself). Appellant's Brief, p. 17. This argument is
unsupportable.
First, there is no case which Block has identified which indicates that damages to
improvements to property (which Block has admitted is the subject of the transaction) constitutes
damages to separate property. In fact, the opposite is quite true. For example, in Blahd v. Richard
B. Smith. Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299, 108 P.3d 996, 999 (2005), the plaintiffs contemplated
purchasing a house which apparently had a defect in it (a crack in a concrete slab in the basement
of the house). Id. Regardless, the plaintiffs purchased the horne and added improvements (such
as remodeling the house and adding slate tile to place over the crack). Id. When the newly laid
tile cracked along the same lines as the original crack, the plaintiffs brought suit. ld. This court
held that the negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule. ld. at 301, 1001.
Similarly, in Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1005, 895 P.2d 1195,
1198 (1995), the plaintiffs purchased seed potatoes which had been inspected by the State, but
10

R. Vo!. IV, p. 822.
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which allegedly had bacterial ring rot. Id. The plaintiffs then planted the seed potatoes, and the
potatoes grown from them were also infected. Id. Despite the fact that the new potato plants were
damaged as a result of the defect in the subject matter of the contract (i.e. the seed potatoes), this
Court held that the economic loss rule applied to the State. !d. at 1007, 1200.
Under Block's theory, if improvements to the property constituted other property (and
damage to the improvements constituted property damage), then both Blahd and Duffin were
decided wrong. In Blahd, improvements made to the property (i.e. slate tile in the basement)
were damaged by a defect in the property. Under Block's theory, this would be property damage,
and thus void the economic loss rule with regard to all damages. See, e.g., Duffin, 126 Idaho at
1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. The same is true with Duffin: under Block's theory, the damage to the
new potatoes (which are by comparison the improvement to the seed potatoes) would constitute
property damage, since the new potatoes were not the subject of the transaction. However, this
Court has made it clear that damages to improvements to the "subject of the transaction" do not
constitute property damage for purposes of the economic loss rule. Were this Court to accept
such a proposition, the economic loss rule could simply be avoided by adding any minor or
insignificant improvement to any property which was the "subject of the transaction", and when
that improvement was damaged, sue in tort for what should have been contract damages.
In support of his argument, Block relies on Aardema and Brian & Christie, Inc. However,
these two cases do not support the conclusion that the addition of improvements to property will
allow for negligence claims when the improvements are damaged. In Brian & Christie, Inc. v.
Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 24, 244 P.3d 166, 168 (2010), the subject of the transaction

was not actual property, but the rendition of a service. Id. Unlike Brian & Christie. Inc., there is
no contract for services at issue in this case. Indeed, in Brian & Christie. Inc., the Supreme Court
states outright that the "district court's attempt to apply [the property based] formulation of the
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[economic loss] rule to a case involving the rendition of services illustrates why it does not apply
to such cases." Id. at 26, 170. This Court ultimately held that negligent provision of a service
which damages property is not subject to the economic loss rule. Id. at 29, 173. Such a holding
does not apply to a situation in which a plaintiff purchases property with an unknown defect in it,
as happened in this case, Blahd, Duffin, Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40, 740 P.2d
1022, 1025 (1987), and a number of other cases. I I
Block's reliance on Aardema is similarly faulty. Aardema at no point indicates that
improvements to "the subject of the transaction" constitute separate property. In Aardema, the
plaintiffs alleged that the milking system they had purchased caused damage to their cows.
Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys.! Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 788, 215 P.3d 505, 508 (2009). The

disagreement was whether the milking system or the cows were the "subject of the transaction".
Id. at 791, 511. There was no allegation of improvements to the milking system, and it was clear

that the cattle were separate property. This court held that "the milking machines are the subject
of the transaction." Id There was no question in Aardema, as there is in this case (and as there
was in Blahd) of improvements or attachments to the "subject of the transaction". Therefore,
Aardema provides no guidance in this present case.

Second (in addition to Block's inability to point to a case holding that damage to
improvements constitutes separate property damage) is the fact that Block cannot reasonably
argue the houses and improvements are not the subject of the transaction. In this case, there is
only one transaction: Block's purchase of property from Streibick. There is no other contract at
issue. R. Vol. I, pp. 20 - 23 (breach of contract claims against Streibick all stern out of the sale of

11

See also State v. Mitchell Const. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984) (defective roof);
Clark v. Int'! Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,332,581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978) (defective parts for a tractor); Ramerth v.
Hart, 133 Idaho 194,196,983 P.2d 848,850 (1999) (defective airplane).
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the property). Block relies on a footnote from Aardema l2 to show that the subject of the
underlying transaction should only be considered to be "the four bare lots that comprised SP No.
8.... This real property is the subject of this lawsuit." Appellant's Brief, p. 39. As the Aardema
footnote states, "the underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the
transaction." Aardema, 147 Idaho at 791, 215 P.3d at 511 (fn. 2). Based on this footnote, the
improvements which Block claims suffered property damage are still the subject of the
transaction.
Block purchased the property on August 10, 2005, while the property was still designated
as SP 4, block No.3. R. Vol. I, p. 13.i3 In essence, Block was purchasing property which was
being subdivided by Streibick, with the intent to subdivide it further. Block admits that he further
subdivided SP 8 lots 1-4, and made at least 11 lots out of such properties. R. Vol. I, pp. 13 - 14.
Block also admits he purchased the property with the intent to improve, develop, and build on
the properties. R. Vol. II, p. 275 (Block Dep. p. 85). Block further admits that he purchased the
property "for the purpose of constructing and selling single family residences." Appellant's Brief,
p. 7. Block's admitted purpose in purchasing the property is similar, if not identical, to the
situation in DutJin, where the plaintiffs purchased the seed potatoes with the understood intent
that they would be planting the potatoes. See Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198. If the
underlying contract in Du(fin had been deemed to merely be the purchase of the seed potatoes,
then the economic loss rule should not have applied to the new potatoes (and potato plants)
grown from such seeds, nor the resultant lost profits. In essence, the subject of the underlying

12

Block cites to Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys., Inc.. 147 Idaho 785, 791,215 P.3d 505, 511 (2009) (Fn. 2).

13

Block contends that he was purchasing lots 1-4 of SP 8, which is what the purchase documents say.
However, even though Block intended to by lots 1-4 of SP 8, no such subdivision had been recorded or approved on
Aug. 10,2005. The City Council meeting at which SP 8 was approved did not occur until August 15,2005. R. Vol.
II, p. 368 - 370. Thus, Block was purchasing property which he knew to be in the subdivision approval process, but
which had not yet been approved.
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transaction must take into consideration the intended use of the purchased property, or else the
purpose of the economic loss rule is gutted.
For example, in Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 39, 740 P.2d 1022, 1024
(1987), the plaintiffs were interested in "purchasing the duplexes [which were the subject of the
transaction] as investment property." When problems arose with the property, the plaintiffs sued
for "damages for loss of rental value and costs of repair." Id. at 40, 1025. This becomes
significant because the type of damages sought in Duffin, Tusch, and this case are all essentially
contract damages (i.e. lost profits for crops, lost rental value, and in this case, loss of value and
loss of profits on sale, see Appellant's Brief, p. 17). The intent of the contract, whether
purchasing seeds to plant, duplexes to rent, or property to develop and then sell, matters because
the damages being sought are contract damages (i.e. expectation damages), which the economic
loss rule says one cannot obtain in a tort action. While the contract may identify the property
purchased (as opposed to the reason purchased), it is not the sole subject matter of the
transaction. If that were the case, then lost profits would never be allowed as contract damages,
because they were not the subject of the contract. 14 Block simply cannot say that the subject
matter of the transaction was just four lots of earth, because the lots of earth were never intended
to remain so. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. If the Court were to accept Block's interpretation of
"subject matter of the transaction", the economic loss rule would never apply. Any improvement
to the property would be sufficient to create new property which would or could result in
separate property damage, rendering the economic loss rule ineffective. The City and Cutshaw
request that this Court reject Block's interpretation that the damage to the improvements to the
property constitutes "damage to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction."
Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196,983 P.2d 848,850 (1999).
14

We know this is not true, because lost profits are allowed in contract actions.
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Third, basic property law principles show that damage to the houses, pools, retaining
walls, and other improvements does not constitute property damage. After Block purchased the
property, there is no question that he made improvements. R. Vol. I, p. 14 - 15. However, every
improvement he made became a fixture to the property. In Idaho, anything which is "affixed to
the land" becomes part of the real property.

Ie.

§ 55-101. When Block built the houses, pools,

retaining walls, windows, gas lines, etc., there is no doubt that he actually annexed such items to
the property, with the intent to make it permanent and adapted to the property. Everitt v. Higgins,
122 Idaho 708, 711, 838 P.2d 311, 314 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus, even though at the time he
purchased the property there were no improvements, at the time the defect manifested itself in
2007, and again in 2009, such defect affected only things which were affixed to the real property,
which means that only the real property was damaged. Block cannot argue that separate property
damage occurred when legally, the only things that were damaged were the fixtures on the real
property, which Block admits was the subject matter of the transaction. Appel/ant's Brief, p. 39.
By affixing the houses and other improvements to the property, Block himself intended the
improvements to become part of the real property (as evidenced by the fact that he was trying to
sell the developed property with the houses and improvements on it, see R. Vol. I, p. 14
(Complaint

~

16). If there were different facts, such as that the defect in the property had

damaged something not affixed to the property (i.e. a car, or as discussed in Aardema's, the cows
which were not permanently affixed to the milking machines), a different discussion could be
had. However, Block can point to no damages other than damages to what he built into and onto
the property. Therefore, the only damage which has occurred affected the subject of the
transaction itself (i.e. the real property), resulting in loss of value to the property. The City and
Cutshaw request that this Court determine such damages are not recoverable under the economic
15

Aardema, 147 Idaho at 791, 215 P.3d at 511.
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loss rule.
Finally, aside from the issue of whether the damaged property is the subject of the
transaction, the City and Cutshaw contend that a number of reasons support the conclusion that
the economic loss rule applies to all of Block's alleged damages. First, as stated at the beginning
of this section, the point of the economic loss rule is to prevent a party from seeking in tort what
they should be seeking in contract. Block admits that his damages are construction and
abatement expenses, loss of value, and inability to sell the properties (or lost profits). Appellant's
Brief, p. 17. All of these damages fit the definition of economic loss stated in Salmon River:

"costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as
well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon
Rivers Sportsman Camps. Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309

(1975). In essence, Block has brought a negligence action against the City and Cutshaw to
recover contract damages. However, Block also had a source against which he could recover
contract damages: Streibick.
In fact, the record shows that Block settled all of his claims with Streibick. R. Vol. IV, pp.
727 - 28. A similar situation arose in Excel Const.. Inc. v. HKM Eng'g. Inc., 2010 WY 34, 228
P.3d 40 (Wyo. 2010), which involved a contract between a contractor and an engineer regarding
replacing a city's water lines. Id. at 42. Though addressing construction contracts, the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated
that parties to a construction contract have the opportunity to allocate the
economic risks associated with the work, and that they do not need the special
protections of tort law to shield them from losses arising from risks, including
negligence of a design professional, which are inherent in performance of the
contract.
Id. at 45. Like the plaintiff in Excel Construction, Block "had the opportunity to allocate the risks

associated with the costs of the work when it contracted with [Streibick] and, in fact, entered into
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a detailed contract which allowed it the means, method and opportunity to recover economic
losses allegedly caused by [the alleged] negligence." Id. Further, Block had a number of other
contracts which he could have utilized to allocate his risk, such as with the company that did
compaction 16 testing or his engineer Hasenoehrl 17 (who worked on subdividing the properties,
and whom he has chosen not to sue). That Block did not allocate his risks better does not mean
he should be allowed to recover his contract damages in tort claims against the City and
Cutshaw. Thus, Block has been paid for his contract claims, and should not be allowed to
continue to seek contract damages against the City and Cutshaw under negligence claims.
Block relies on a number of cases to show that the economic loss rule does not apply in
this case. For example, Block relies on Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112
Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986). Though Block adequately states the facts of that case, Block
fails to note the two essential distinguishing factors from this case: 1) the underlying contract
was for provision of services, like Brian & Christie, Inc. 18, and 2) the plaintiff had had cattle
stolen from him, not damaged. Oppenheimer Indus., Inc., 112 Idaho at 424 - 26, 732 P.2d at 662
- 64. Neither of these features is present in this case. Block's situation is closer to Duffin, Tusch,
Ramerth, Blahd, and all those cases in which the contract is for defective property. Further, as

Block still acknowledges that he owns the property at issue, Oppenheimer does not apply.
What Block refuses to acknowledge is that this present case is similar, if not identical, to
Duffin. As discussed above, in Duffin, the State Department of Agriculture (who was not a party

to the sales contract) was sued in negligence for failing to identify a disease in seed potatoes.
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199. The same is true here: Block seeks to recover

16

The compaction testing was done by Allwest Testing, and notified Block of certain concerns and problems
with the property. See R. Vol. II, p. 333.
17

See Appel/ant's Brief, p. 14.

18

There was no defective property at issue in Oppenheimer.
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against a governmental entity (who was not a party to the sales contract) for negligent inspection
and for improperly issuing permits. R. Vol. I, p. 23 - 25 (Complaint,

~

55 (allegations of the

City's negligence». Block seeks the same types of damages here (lost value, lost profits, repair
costs) as were sought in Dufjin (lost revenues, etc.). The City and Cutshaw contend that the
result in this case should be no different than in Duffin. Block has suffered economic loss, and
had the ability to sue under contract theories for these damages. He should not be able to recover
the damages again in tort.
Plaintiff also ignores a case recently decided which has very similar aspects to this case.
In Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 (Idaho
Dec. 20, 2012), the plaintiff contracted for a well to be drilled on his undeveloped property. Id. at

*1. After the well was installed, the plaintiff built a house and landscaped the property. Id. When
the well collapsed, the plaintiff sued the well driller. Id. The plaintiff contended that the
economic loss rule did not apply because the well collapse caused damage to his property. Id. at
*7. This Court found that the plaintiff's allegation that the only property which was damaged
was the well itself and the cost of tearing out surrounding landscaping to repair the well was
insufficient to show property damage. Id. The same analysis applies to this case: Block's only
damage was to the property he purchased and that which he affixed to the property. Like the
plaintiff in Stapleton, Block has not identified any property damage which would support a
negligence claim.
The City and Cutshaw request that this Court affirm Judge Kerrick's determination that
"the subject of the transaction is the property developed by Block which is contained within the
subdivisions, as well as the houses built upon this property." R. Vol. IV, p. 822. The economic
loss rule should apply to all of Block's damages, and all claims against the City and Cutshaw
were properly dismissed.
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2. No Exception to the Economic Loss Rule Applies in this Case.
There are three exceptions where economic loss may be recovered in negligence claims.
The City and Cutshaw contend that Judge Kerrick rightly concluded that none of such exceptions
apply.
First, "economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or
property." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. As discussed above, there was no
separate damage to person or property. All damage was to the "subject of the transaction."
Therefore, this exception does not apply.
Next, "Economic loss might also be recovered in tort where the occurrence of a unique
circumstance requires a different allocation of the risk." Id. at 1007 - 08, 1200 - 01. See also
Just's. Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470,583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978). Block makes

no attempt to argue that such exception applies. Even if he did, there is no basis for this
exception to apply. The purchase or subdivision of property is not a "'unique circumstance'
requiring a re-allocation of the risk" any more than seed potato certification was in Duffin.
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. As the Court stated in Blahd, "The purchase of a

residential house is an everyday occurrence and does not create the type of unique circumstances
required to justify a different allocation of risk, particularly where it appears there may be other
defendants available to respond in contract damages." Blahd, 141 Idaho at 302, 108 P.3d at 1002.
The same applies to subdivision, development, and sale of property. Therefore, this exception
should not apply.
Finally, "an exception to the economic loss rule is applicable in cases involving a 'special
relationship' between the parties." Du{fin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Though Block
does not argue the special relationship exception in his discussion of the economic loss rule, see
Appellant's Brief, pp. 37 - 44, he does have a section titled "Special Relationship" in his
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discussion of duty. Appellant's Brief, pp. 22 - 24. With regard to the special relationship
exception, this Court has stated that
There are only two situations in which this Court has found the special
relationship exception applies. One situation is where a professional or quasiprofessional performs personal services . . . . The other situation involving a
special relationship is where an entity holds itself out to the public as having
expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces
reliance on its performance of that function.
Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001 (citing MeAlvain v. Genera/Ins. Co. o(Ameriea, 97
Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976), and Dutfin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201).
Unlike MeAlvain, the City and Cutshaw did not provide any professional services, nor does
Block allege that they did so.
With regard to the second part of the special relationship test, Block does not discuss it.
Instead he focuses on whether a duty arose under the "public duty rule", Appellant's Brief, p. 23,
which is quite different from the circumstances outlined in Blahd and Duffin. In Duffin, one
defendant was a private, non-profit corporation which the Court pointed out "held itself out as
having expertise in the performance of a specialized function; it is the only entity which can
certify seed potatoes in the state of Idaho", and had engaged in a marketing campaign to induce
people to buy seed that it had certified. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. Thus, this
Court held that the exception applied to that defendant. Id. There is no allegation that the City or
Cutshaw engaged in such behavior in this case. Instead, the City and Cutshaw are analogous to
the State Department of Agriculture in Dutfin, which the Court held did not hold itself out to the
public as having expertise in a specific area. Id. Indeed, the City and Cutshaw did not hold
themselves out as having expertise regarding a specialized function any more than did the
Department of Agriculture in Duffin. See Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. Therefore,
even if Block were arguing that the City and Cutshaw had a special relationship with Block,
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there is no evidence to support such a contention.
Based on the foregoing, the City and Cutshaw request that this Court find, as did Judge
Kerrick, that "there is no evidence in this case that the City of Lewiston held itself out to the
public as having expertise regarding a specialized function." R. Vol. IV, pp. 824 - 25. Because no
exception to the economic loss rule applies, the City and Cutshaw request that this Court find
that all of Block's damages are barred by the economic loss rule, and that summary judgment
was properly granted.
C.

JUDGE KERRICK PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IMMUNITIES UNDER
LC. §§ 6-904(1) & (7) AND 6-904B(3) & (4) APPLIED.
This Court applies a three step analysis to determine whether summary judgment has

properly been granted on the issue of immunities under the Idaho Tort Claims Act:
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity
and its employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), this Court must
engage in a three step analysis. First, we must determine whether tort recovery is
allowed under the laws of Idaho. This is essentially a determination of whether
there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, this Court determines if an
exception to liability under the !TCA shields the alleged misconduct from
liability. Finally, if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle
the moving party to dismissal.

Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 14 - 15 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the state of Idaho, see, e.g., Nation v.

State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 487 (1995), and therefore do
not address this first step of the analysis. Judge Kerrick found exceptions to liability on all claims
against the City and Cutshaw under

Ie.

§§ 6-904(1) and 6-904B(3) & (4), and to Complaint ~

55(vi) under 1 e. § 6-904(7). R. Vol. IV, pp. 829 - 36. Block now contends that Judge Kerrick
was mistaken on all these counts.
1.

Judge Kerrick Correctly Determined that Both the Lewiston City Counsel and
City Engineer Shawn Stubbers Made Discretionary Acts Under Ie. § 6-904(1).
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There are two separate immunities in 1 C. § 6-904(1): the statutory/regulatory function
immunity, and the discretionary function immunity. 19
A governmental entity and its employees . . . shall not be liable for any claim
which:
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a
statutory or regulatory function ... Q! based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
governmental entity or employee thereof.
1 C. § 6-904(1) (emphasis added). The "exercising ordinary care" requirement only applies to the

statutory/regulatory function immunity, not discretionary function immunity.
The "'regulatory function' and 'discretionary function' clauses of I.C. § 6-904(1)
represented two different types of actions that might be immune under the ITCA
but the same test applied to each." Leliefetd v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 363, 659
P.2d 111, 117 (1983); see also Sterling, 111 Idaho at 229-30, 723 P.2d at 773-74.
In Jones v. City ofS1. Maries, Justice Huntley noted that the first clause of I.C. §
6-904(1) affords governmental employees immunity if they act with ordinary
care and in accordance with policy decisions. 111 Idaho 733, 745, 727 P.2d
1161, 1173 (1986) (Huntley, J., concurring).

Rees v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,20, 137 P.3d 397, 407 (2006) (emphasis
added). See also Lelie{eld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 363, 659 P.2d 111, 117 (1983) ("While the
creation of a governing policy might well be discretionary, nonetheless, a negligent failure in the
furtherance of that policy could well be tortious and outside the screen of immunity."); Lawton v.

City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459, 886 P.2d 330, 335 (1994) (inclusion ofthe word "or" in a
statute meant in the alternative, as opposed to requiring both elements). In other words, enacting
a discretionary function will be immune if it is truly discretionary, but an employee's act in
executing or performing as a statute or regulation requires will only be immune if the employee
acts with ordinary care. 1 C. § 6-904(1). This is relevant because the City and Cutshaw only

19

The immunities under this section will fail if there is malice or criminal intent. IC § 6-904. Block makes
no allegation of malice or criminal intent, and so this issue is not discussed.
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contended that they were entitled to discretionary function immunity under I C. § 6-904( 1),
which is the immunity Judge Kerrick addressed in his rulings. See R. Vol. IV, pp. 831 - 35.
Therefore, Block's discussion of whether the City and/or Cutshaw acted with ordinary care20 is
irrelevant.
"The discretionary function exception applies to governmental decisions entailing
planning or policy formation." Dorea Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425,
163 P.3d 211, 214 (2007). "Routine, everyday matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy
factors will more likely than not be 'operational.' Decisions and actions which involve a
consideration of the financial, political, economic and social effects of a given plan or policy will
generally be 'planning' and fall within the discretionary function exception." Ransom v. City of
Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 205, 743 P.2d 70, 73 (1987). If the decision is discretionary, the

Court then examines "the underlying policies of the discretionary function, which are: to permit
those who govern to do so without being unduly inhibited by the threat of liability for tortious
conduct, and also, to limit judicial re-examination of basic policy decisions properly entrusted to
other branches of government." Dorea Enterprises, Inc, 144 Idaho at 425, 163 P.3d at 214.
Two decisions which were relevant to this case fall under the discretionary function
immunity. First, in 1997, the Lewiston City Council adopted a revised subdivision code
(pursuant to City Ordinance 4177) which removed all mandatory requirements for slope stability
or geotechnical analyses, and instead gave the city engineer discretion when to require such
studies. R. Vol. II, pp. 387 - 440 (specifically §§ 32-9(b)(2)(f), 32-20(c)(2) and 32-31(e)).
Second, Lewiston City Engineer Shawn Stubbers made a decision, based on numerous policy
factors, not to require a geotechnical/slope stability analysis of the property at issue. R. Vol. IV,
p. 834. Block fails to address either of these discretionary decisions in his briefing, see
20

Appellant's Brief, pp. 27
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31.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 26 - 31, even though they are the basis of Judge Kerrick's determination

that discretionary immunity applies. R. Vol. IV, pp. 831 - 35. Instead, Block discusses acts that
show that the City did not act with reasonable care. However, as discussed above, this is
irrelevant for purposes of discretionary function immunity.
The City contends that Block's alleged damages purportedly arise out of the fact that no
geotechnical evaluation was required during subdivision of the property. R. Vol. IV, p. 834.
Block confirms this. Appellant's Brief, p. 30 (failing to require geotechnical studies was
negligent). Therefore, the change to the city codes and the decision not to require a geotechnical
analysis are the decisions which allegedly lead to his damages. But the decisions should be
deemed discretionary. Based on the changes to the Lewiston City Code, a policy shift occurred
whereby mandatory slope stability analysis was no longer required. The enacting of city
ordinances by a city council is clearly the type of policy or planning decision that should be
treated as discretionary, and also fits the underlying policies of the immunity. See Dorea
Enterprises, Inc., 144 Idaho at 425, 163 P.3d at 214 ("greater rank or authority will most likely

coincide with greater responsibility for planning or policy formation decisions"); City of
Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 855, 853 P.2d 596, 600 (Ct. App. 1993) (city's decision

when to purchase property was discretionary).
Similarly, the decision by Lewiston City Engineer Shawn Stubbers not to require a
geotechnical analysis of the property during the subdivision process was also discretionary. This
Court has several times recognized that governmental employee decisions can rise to the level of
discretionary functions. For example, in Dorea, when a sewage department supervisor
considered a number of factors, including "money, budgets, the amount of people that [they] had,
[specifically,] the amount of educated people," when deciding how often to flush out the city's
sewer system, that decision was deemed to be policy making and, ultimately, discretionary.
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Dorea Enterprises, Inc., 144 Idaho at 426, 163 P.3d 211, 215 (2007). As this Court has stated,

"decisions made under statutes and regulations which leave room for policy judgment in their
execution are discretionary." Crown v. State, Dept. ofAgric., 127 Idaho 175, 181,898 P.2d 1086,
1092 (1995). The Lewiston City Code language at issue gave the City Engineer broad discretion
as to when to require a geotechnical or slop stability analysis. R. Vol. 11, pp. 387 - 440
(specifically §§ 32-9(b)(2)(f), 32-20(c)(2) and 32-31(e)). Indeed, Mr. Stubbers decision was
based on numerous policy factors: the limited time in which a subdivision application could be
reviewed, staff training, budgetary concerns, discussion with outside experts, etc. R. Vol. III, pp.
645,648 (Stubbers Dep., pp. 37 - 38,52); R. Vol. IV, p. 834. This sort of decision also fulfills the
underlying policies of discretionary immunity, in avoiding second guessing decisions made by
the city engineer, and avoiding liability for decisions with regard to subdivision applications.
Based on the foregoing, the City and Cutshaw ask this Court to conclude that Judge
Kerrick properly dismissed all of Block's claims under the discretionary function immunity.
Numerous other discretionary functions 2 ] discussed in the briefing before the District Court, but
not relied on in Judge Kerrick's Memorandum Decisions, will not be addressed at this point.
2.

Under

Because there are No Issues of Material Fact as to Gross Negligence, Judge
Kerrick Properly Granted Immunity under Ie. § 6-904B(3) & (4).

Ie.

§§ 6-904B(3) & (4), the City and Cutshaw are immune from any claim that

"Arises out of the issuance ... or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization," or "Arises out of the failure to make
an inspection, or the making of an inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other
than the property of the governmental entity performing the inspection," unless an employee
acted with "malice or criminal intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and
21

Such as the policy decision not to copy entire subdivision files to place in a new subdivision files. See R.
Vol. I, p. 232 - 33, Vol. IV, p. 716.
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wanton conduct." See Hoffer v. City o(Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 403,257 PJd 1226, 1229 (2011)
(allegations of malice, criminal intent, etc. only apply to employees, and not the city itself).
Judge Kerrick concluded that the language of Ie. § 6-904B(3) & (4) was broad enough
to cover "any claims of negligence which are based on issuance of building or other permits,
approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or not inspecting the property at issue." R. Vol. IV, p.
830. Because the underlying basis of all of Block's claims was the alleged failure to inspect,
require studies, or the issuance of permits, the immunity under these statutes required dismissal
of all claims. Id. at 829 - 30. Block now appeals on the basis that there is a question of fact as to
whether "the City acted with gross negligence.,,22 Appellant's Brief, p. 34 (emphasis added).
As a matter of law, a City cannot act with gross negligence. In Hotter, the plaintiff sued
the City of Boise for various tort claims under the I.T.C.A, alleging that various city employees
acted with malice and criminal intent. Hoffer, 151 Idaho at 401, 257 P.3d at 1227. This Court
upheld dismissal of the claims, in part, on the grounds that no city employee was named as a
party to the lawsuit, stating
Because Hoffer only appeals the dismissal of claims that are included within that
section, and because he did not name any individual employee as a defendant, as a
matter of law under I.C. § 6-904(3) he could not recover against the City. The
district court was correct in dismissing those claims. If he had included an
employee as a defendant, his claims against that employee alleging malice or
criminal intent would have survived under I.e. § 6-904(3) because an employee
is only immune from suit for those intentional torts if there is no allegation of
malice and/or criminal intent.

Id., at 403, 1229. In other words, the umbrella language of Ie. § 6-904 stating that the
immunities fail if there is malice or criminal intent only applies to city employees named as
parties to the lawsuit; the city itself cannot have malice or criminal intent.
Though Hofftr dealt with 1 e. § 6-904, the umbrella language of 1 e. § 6-904B exactly
22
Block does not discuss malice, criminal intent, or reckless, willful and wanton conduct in his brief, so they
will not be discussed here.
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mirrors the structure of 1 C. § 6-904, but just adds "gross negligence" and "reckless, willful and
wanton conduct" to the list of conduct that would preclude the immunity's application. Thus, the
City of Lewiston cannot be grossly negligent; only its employees can. Block only named one
Lewiston employee to this lawsuit, and that was former City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw. Taking
this a step further, there is not a single issue of fact that Cutshaw acted with gross negligence.
None of Block's alleged material facts listed on Appellant's Brief, pp. 34 - 36 identify any act or
inaction of Lowell Cutshaw. 23 Block's statement of facts only mentions Cutshaw to indicate that
he was an employee of the City, and that he attended a meeting with Block. Appellant's Brief,
pp. 7, 16. In order to establish that Cutshaw acted with gross negligence, Block will have to
show that Cutshaw did or failed to do
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar
responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others.
I C. § 6-904C(1). Though Block contends that the District Court improperly determined that

Block had a high burden to overcome with regard to immunities24 , Appellant's Brief, pp. 33 - 34,
Block cannot argue that he had no burden. Once a governmental entity contends that an
immunity applies,
the plaintiff must prove a claim which does not fall within the exception to
governmental liability ... and must establish that the governmental entity, or its
employees acting within the course and scope of their employment, was negligent
or [committed] otherwise wrongful acts or omissions which were the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injuries.

23

Instead, they list comments by City Public Works Director Chris Davies, Building Official John Smith,
Assistant City Engineer Shawn Stubbers, and a number of other former and current employees, none of whom are
parties to this lawsuit.
24

Block misconstrues Judge Kerrick's statement in this regard. The case Judge Kerrick relied on only stood
for the proposition that an employee is presumed to be acting without malice or criminal intent, and so Block would
have to overcome this presumption. R. Vol. IV, p. 830 (citing Boise Tower Associates. LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho
774, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009». As Block was not alleging malice or criminal intent, this did not become an
issue. Block only had to meet his burden to show evidence of gross negligence.
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Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 364, 716 P.2d 505,508 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, it is Block's burden to establish that Cutshaw acted or failed to act in a way that he should
have been inescapably drawn to recognize as his duty, and acted with deliberate indifference to
harmful consequences. So far, all Block has alleged was that Cutshaw was an employee, and had
attended a meeting. This scintilla of information does not establish that Cutshaw had any
particular duty (or should have been drawn to recognize a duty). Further, the fact that Cutshaw
attended a meeting does not show deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to Block,
and is not sufficient to overturn entry of summary judgment on this issue. See G & M Farms v.

Funk!rr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) ("plaintiffs case must be anchored
in something more than speculation and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue"). Therefore, as there is no evidence that the only employee sued acted with gross
negligence, Block has not met his burden. Summary jUdgment was appropriately granted based
on this immunity.
Even were this Court to determine (contrary to Hofftr) that the gross negligence
exception applies to the City itself (or any unnamed employee), Block still cannot show that
gross negligence occurred. All of Block's allegations of gross negligence revolve around the fact
that the City failed to notify Block that the slope movement had apparently occurred. Appel/ant's

Brief, pp. 34 - 36. However, failure to notify does not establish gross negligence on its own.
Even if it is assumed that the City or some nameless employee had such a duty25, there is no
evidence that failing to notify Block resulted in deliberate indifference to the harmful
consequences to Block. First, the City hid nothing. The memo regarding the earth movement was

25

Block can point to no specific duty in either statute or city code which requires the City to search records
and provide all information about a property to a subdivider; instead, he relies on comments made by City
employees which are taken out of context to show a duty exists. Appellant's Brief, pp. 35 - 36.
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prominently placed in a publicly available file 26 , giving potential purchasers and developers (at
least those who did due diligence and looked in such files prior to purchasing such property) all
the notice they needed as to the issue. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 7 ("Constructive notice is
meant to protect innocent persons about to engage in lawful transactions, by encouraging
diligence in protecting one's rights and preventing fraud. It is based on the premise that citizens
have no right to shut their eyes or ears to avoid information and then say they had no notice. ").
Second, and crucial to the determination of gross negligence, is an analysis of what the
City could have known simply from the memo in the file. Looking at the memo, all a person
would know is that in March, 1999, a non-city employee provided pictures of alleged earth
movement to the City. R. Vol. II, p. 248. The memo does not say what caused the earth
movement (or how it is known that the land in the photo has suffered earth movement), and does
not state when the alleged earth movement occurred, whether it was stable or active, or a myriad
of other factors that would affect any future decisions about the property. Id. It is impossible for
the City to be indifferent to harmful consequences when there is no evidence that harmful
consequences would or could result. 27 In other words, the City and its employees, just based on
the memo in the file, had no knowledge that there was unstable ground in the area. All they had
was a photograph of a crack in some ground, which a non-city employee claimed showed earth
movement. But since no study was done on the property (by the owner of the property or by the
photograph taker), and no study results were provided to the City, the City had no basis to
believe the property shouldn't be developed or built on. Thus, Block cannot show that there was
gross negligence as defined by J C. § 6-904C(1).
26

See R. Vol. II, p. 278, Block Dep., p. 180 (Block stated he found it immediately upon searching the SP4
subdivision file).
27

If Block's own experts don't know what is causing the earth movement, see R. Vol. IV, p. 714, then it
would be impossible for the City or its employees, based on a picture of a crack in the ground, to determine whether
the situation is unsafe, or even whether the crack is 40 years old or more.
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Third, what also is known from the file is that the then property owner (Streibick) was
notified about the condition on the property. R. Vol. II, p. 249 - 51. Contrary to showing that the
City was indifferent to harmful consequences, the City took action by notifying the current
landowner so that he could address the issue. Instead, without notifying the City, Streibick
covered up the cracks, and never attempted to find out how old they were or what caused them.
R. Vol. II, p. 269 (Morrison Dep., p. 57). Block has presented no evidence that if the City did

inspect the property any time between 1999 and 2005, it would have discovered slope movement
(as such movement had been hidden).
The result is that Block has not met his burden to show that the City and its employees
(especially Cutshaw) acted with gross negligence. This is not a situation like S. Gri(fin Canst..
Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 190-91, 16 P.3d 278, 287-88 (2000) where the city's

failure to inspect a building about to be torn down resulted in missing the fact that adjacent
buildings were connected (and thus creating an issue of fact whether gross negligence occurred).
This case is more similar to Crown v. State. Dept. ofAgric., 127 Idaho 188, 190, 898 P.2d 1099,
1101 (Ct. App. 1994) (affd in part, rev'd in part28 , 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995», where
a state inspector, despite having been notified of a potential deficit in inventory, failed to
discover that a warehouse manager had fraudulently inflated the inventory of beans in the
warehouse by putting hundreds of boxes full of dirt in the warehouse. After reviewing the record,
the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that "uncontroverted evidence sufficiently justified an
inference that Mr. Sparrow [the inspector] did not act, or omit to act, with deliberate
indifference, and hence that he was not grossly negligent as defined by I.C. § 6-904C." Id. at
193,1104.

28

Crown was not reversed based on any discussion of gross negligence. See Crown v. State, Dept. ofAgric.,
127 Idaho 175, 179, 898 P.2d 1086, 1090 (1995).
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In this case, Block has provided no evidence that a geotechnical evaluation would have
discovered the hidden slope movement. As no geotechnical evaluation has ever been done on the
property, there is no evidence that a geotechnical evaluation would have provided Block with
any information regarding conditions on the property. Thus, the fact that the City and employees
did not inform Block of a memo in a file is not sufficient to show gross negligence. The City and
Cutshaw request that this Court find, as did Judge Kerrick, that there was no deliberate
indifference to harmful consequences. R. Vol. IV, p. 830.
3.

Judge Kerrick Correctly Determined that the Subdivision Plats Contained Public
Property as used in 1 C. § 6-904(7).

The immunity allowed under 1 C. § 6-904(7) states that
A governmental entity and its employees . . . shall not be liable for any claim
which:
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways,
roads, streets. bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in
effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of
the construction bv the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some
other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give
such approval.
1 C. § 6-904(7) (emphasis added). Judge Kerrick found that the City and Cutshaw were immune

under this provision only to Complaint

~

55(vi) (which alleged that the City was negligent in

approving the subdivision plats for CG and CG 2). R. Vol. IV, pp. 835 - 36. Block contends that
this immunity does not apply because there was no public property at issue, and argues that all
property was private. Appellant's Brief, pp. 32 - 33. There is no dispute that each subdivision
plat at issue (including SP 4, SP 8, CG and CG 2) contained easements dedicated to the City. The
Administrative Plat for SP 8 contains city roads, storm sewer easements, a storm drain easement
connected to a public easement for a detention pond, and stream easements. R. Vol. II, pp. 257 58. The Amended Administrative Plat for SP 8 shows the same, with additional public
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easements. Id, pp. 259 - 60. The Administrative Plat for CG shows the easements described
above, with additional public easements, and specifically shows the detention pond, which is
labeled as "Storm Drain Pond Easement". Id, pp. 261 - 62. All of these plats were approved by
the Lewiston City Council, and all of them were prepared by Block's own engineer Eric
HasenoehrI of Keltic Engineering. Id., pp. 257 - 62. Thus, the plats are a plan, and either meet
the substantial conformance requirement29 or the approved in advance requirement. See Lawton

v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459, 886 P.2d 330, 335 (1994) (immunity is available if
either substantial conformance or advance approval element is met). Thus, the only question is
whether the easements constitute public property.
Block argues that this immunity only applies to "public projects". Appellant's Brief, p.
33. However, the statute does not use that language; instead, by its own plain language, it applies
to "public property."

Ie.

§ 6-904(7). All of the easements and rights-of-way on the plat maps

constitute public property. The Lewiston City Code states that
Sec. 31-3. Right-of-way work - Permit required No person shall dig up, break,
excavate, obstruct, tunnel, undermine, or disturb any street or other public
property, place any obstruction thereon or fill in, place, leave, or deposit upon the
same any earth, rubbish, garbage, rock or other material that may obstruct, disturb
or interfere with the free use thereof without first obtaining a permit therefor from
the department.

Lewiston City Code § 31-3?O A right of way is defined as "improved or unimproved public
property, dedicated or deeded to the city for the purpose of providing for vehicular, pedestrian
and public use." Id § 31-2. Rights-of-way include utility easements. Id § 31-9. The City Code
defines an easement as "A grant by the owner of the use of a parcel of land by the public,

29
As the plans were prepared by Block's own engineer, Block cannot argue that the plans were not prepared
in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards, or else he is admitting he submitted improper (and
possibly) negligent plans to the City for approval.

It is appropriate for Courts to take judicial notice of city ordinances. See City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91
Idaho 322, 328, 420 P.2d 805, 811 (1966). See also I.e. § 9-101(3).
30
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corporation, or persons for a specified use and purposes and so designated on a plat." Id. § 32-4.
Based on these codes, no structures may be built on utility easements, no property owner could
have done work on the easements, and all storm and wastewater easements must be kept in a
condition to provide access to the City. See id., § 36-1. Indeed, this Court has recognized that a
utility easement constitutes a taking, though not a compensable one. See Hughes v. State, 80
Idaho 286, 293, 328 P.2d 397, 401 (1958) (overruled by Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140
Idaho 536, 542, 96 P.3d 637,643 (2004)).
Based on the language in the Lewiston City Code, it is difficult to imagine that the storm
water/sewer easements and dedications for public roads included on the subdivision plats do not
constitute public property. Block could not interfere with or build on them, and had to maintain
access for City use. Even utilizing Block's definition, see Appellant's Brief, p. 33, the easements
were not restricted to any individual's use. Though an easement may run through an individual's
property, it is dedicated to the City's use, and should be considered public property for the
purposes of immunity under I C. § 6-904(7). Therefore, the City and Cutshaw request that this
Court affirm Judge Kerrick's ruling with regard to plan/design immunity.

D.

THE CITY AND CUTSHAW CONTEND THAT THERE ARE OTHER BASES
FOR AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL.
The Supreme Court has recently stated that, "The respondent can seek to sustain a

judgment for reasons that were presented to the trial court even though they were not addressed
or relied upon by the trial court in its decision." Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co.

Inc., 39198-2011, 2012 WL 6620615 at *6 (Idaho Dec. 20, 2012). See also Walker v. Shoshone
County, 112 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290,292 (1987). The City and Cutshaw contend that there
were several issues presented to the District Court which were not ruled on. See R. Vol. IV, p.
827 (fn. 3).
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The City and Cutshaw contend that the following are issues (which were presented to the
District Court) which show that granting summary judgment was appropriate:
1.

Block could not establish what caused his damages because he could not establish
what caused the earth movement. R. Vol. I, pp. 201 - 02; Vol. IV, p. 714 (the City
and Cutshaw's briefing on such issue).

2.

The City owed no duty to Block to require a geotechnical evaluation be done on
the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 199 - 201; R. Vol. IV, pp. 711 - 12 (briefing on such
issue).

3.

The City had no affirmative duty to seek out and disclose every piece of
information which was freely available in a public file. R. Vol. V, pp. 990 - 91
(briefing on this issue, which Block raised for the first time in his Motion for
Reconsideration).

4.

The decision by the City not to do research into a property for developers and not
to put copies of all documents contained in prior subdivision files into new
subdivision files (when an old subdivision is resubdivided) constitutes a
discretionary decision for purposes of immunity under 1 e. § 6-904(1). R. Vol. I,
pp. 206 - 07; R. Vol. IV, pp. 715 - 16 (briefing on this issue).

As these issues have been previously briefed (see the citations to the record cited above),
aIld as Block did not address these issues in his opening brief, these arguments will not be
repeated at length. The City and Cutshaw request that the Court consider the briefing previously
provided to the District Court on these issues as a basis for affirming the Judgment on other
grounds.

E.

THE CITY AND CUTSHAW ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON
APPEAL BECAUSE BLOCK'S APPEAL IS WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN LA\V OR
FACT.
The City and Cutshaw request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to

Ie.

§§ 12-117 and 6-

918A. 1 e. § 12-117 applies because the City is a political subdivision as defined by the statute,
see

1 e. § 12-117(5)(b), and 1 e. § 6-918A applies because this case is brought under the Idaho

Tort Claims Act. Both statutes have a similar standard. Under

Ie.

§ 12-117, attorney fees shall

be awarded if the court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in
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fact or law." I.C. § 12-117(1). Under

Ie.

§ 6-918A, the Court may award attorney fees to the

prevailing party if "the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith
in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.,,31
Regardless of which statute applies, the City and Cutshaw contend that there is no basis
for Block's appeal. As to the duty issues, Block's argument is that a duty was owed to him on
several grounds, but ignores the fact that Judge Kerrick only decided that no duty was owed to
Block before Block purchased the property at issue. There is no basis for Block to argue that a
City owes a duty as to all future property owners. As to economic loss, Block can point to no
Idaho or other state caselaw which supports his contention that the damage to his improvements
to the property at issue constitutes anything other than economic loss.
On the issue of immunities, Block spends a majority of his argument on

Ie.

§ 6-904(1)

directed at the "ordinary care" issues under the statutory/regulatory function immunity, when
Judge Kerrick did not even grant summary judgment under that immunity. As to the immunity
under Ie. § 6-904B(3) & (4), Block points to absolutely no issue of fact which relates to whether
the City and/or Cutshaw acted with gross negligence, and as a matter of law, the City itself
cannot act with gross negligence. Finally, Block contends that immunity was improper under Ie.
§ 6-904(7) by trying to convince this court that dedications for public easements for water,
sewer, streets, and other drainage issues do not constitute "public property". Block presents no
new facts or law to this Court, and provides no reasonable basis on which to overturn Judge
Kerrick's ruling. Therefore, his appeal is without reasonable basis in fact or law, and is in bad
faith.

31

There is some confusion as to whether one of these statutes applies over the other. Compare Beehler v.
Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 658,182 P.3d 713,715 (Ct. App. 2008) (I.e. § 6-918A is exclusive over I.e. § 12117) with Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 811, 229 P.3d 1164, 1173 (2010) (I. e. § 12-117 is exclusive as
to I.e. § 6-918A). Brown does not discuss Beehler, nor explicitly overrule it, so it is unclear whether one statute is
exclusive.
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As to costs, if the City and Cutshaw prevail on appeal, they are entitled to costs pursuant
to IR.C.P. 54 and IA.R. 40 as the prevailing party.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the City and Cutshaw respectfully request that this Court affirm
Judge Kerrick's grant of summary judgment on all grounds.
~
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